August 6, 2022
The future of al-Qaeda following Al-Zawahiri strike
The Return of the Taliban
August 28, 2021
Hamzeh Abu Nowar is a senior research analyst for HMSC. Covering the MENA region. He has conducted research on political violence, extremism and international conflict in the MENA region.
The Return of the Taliban
August 28, 2021
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On July 31, just over an hour after sunrise, al-Qaeda's long-time leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, walked on the balcony of a complex in downtown Kabul, reportedly a favourite post-prayer routine of the jihadist eye surgeon. It was the last thing al-Qaeda Amir could do.
At 6:18 a.m. (0148 GMT), a remote-controlled aircraft (drone) operated by the CIA fired two Hellfire missiles into the balcony, killing the Amir, one of the last remaining key figures behind the terrorist attacks of September 11th, who was living with his family in a safe house approximately two miles from the site of the former U.S. embassy in Afghanistan. Some experts regarded him as the "operational brain" behind the 9/11 attacks and were regarded as bin Laden's right-hand man. He was on the list of 22 most wanted terrorists announced by the US government in 2001 and had a $25 million (£16 million) bounty on his head.
Despite two decades of relentless counter-terrorism operations against al-Qaeda leaders, the death of al-Zawahiri paves the way for the transfer of the organisation's leadership to the third leader in the history of al-Qaeda in four decades, which was formed on Afghan soil after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan and the arrival of the Mujahideen groups to power in 1992.
Immediately following the planned strike, US authorities accused elements of the Taliban Haqqani of sheltering Zawahiri and taking measures to conceal evidence of the strike, the house in which Zawahiri was killed is believed to belong to a superior aide to Sirajuddin Haqqani.
The direct link with the Haqqani network highlights long-standing concerns about the consequences of Sirajuddin Haqqani acting as Afghanistan's de facto Minister of the Interior. The collapse of Afghanistan's national government has made Sirajuddin Haqqani, a longtime ally of al-Qaeda, one of Kabul's most powerful leaders.
Al-Zawahiri location, and the fact that, according to US officials, senior Taliban officials from the Haqqani network were aware of his presence there, indicates that the Taliban, al-Qaeda and the Haqqani network continue to be a triumvirate. Despite the terms of the 2020 Doha agreement, which played a pivotal role in the Taliban's rise to power last year. The Taliban has given assurances that Afghanistan will not be a safe haven for international terrorist groups under this agreement.
Given the emergence of the Islamic State Khorasan Province (IS-K) in Afghanistan, which is opposed to the Taliban and a rival of al-Qaeda, the Taliban require al-Qaeda workforce. It is estimated that there are up to 400 active fighters in Afghanistan to fight the growing IS-K insurgency along the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, making separation even more unlikely. Al-Qaeda, for its part, needs the Taliban to maintain a sanctuary from which they can continue to rebuild their network and their external attack capabilities.
At this time, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken has accused the Taliban of gross violations of the Doha Agreement. Not long ago, on July 6, 2022, the Taliban’s supreme leader declared that “will not allow anyone to use our territory to threaten the security of other countries.” Sirajuddin Haqqani spoke along the same lines in January 2022. All these statements have been unironically presented by al-Qaeda, which broadcasts numerous videos with Zawahiri throughout 2022. In one video, he referred to Osama bin Laden’s pledge that “America shall never dream of peace until we experience peace in Palestine and until all disbelieving enemies leave the land of Muhammad.” and Hamas cofounder Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi’s statement that “we must besiege America with terror,”. In February 2022, the UN evaluation of militant activism in Afghanistan clearly stated: “There are no recent signs that the Taliban has taken steps to limit the activities of foreign terrorist fighters in the country. On the contrary, terrorist groups enjoy greater freedom there than at any time in recent history.”
The Taliban, al-Qaeda and Haqqani share long-standing alliances which have developed over decades. The Haqqani network has been designated as the main liaison between the Taliban and al-Qaida. According to a UN report, Zawahiri met with members of the Haqqani network in February 2020, and they were consulted on the terms of the Doha Agreement with the US.
Some experts have suggested that Zawahiri's death will have minimal impact on the global jihadist movement, describing it as "irrelevant". However, this view does not take into account Zawahiri's vital role in keeping al-Qaeda together. Although Zawahiri has long been criticised for his lack of charisma and the lack of appeal of Osama Bin Laden, most critics fail to recognize that he worked behind closed doors to bring together al-Qaeda affiliates, branches and franchise organizations.
Zawahiri took control of the organisation during the turmoil triggered by the Arab Spring revolutions. He led al-Qaeda throughout this turbulent period, keeping the organization united against the enormous challenge posed by the rise of ISIS. Despite the fact that it was under his leadership that the Iraqi affiliate of al-Qaeda broke off and turned into the Islamic State. Nevertheless, by presenting al-Qaida as a less drastic option for the Islamic State, Zawahiri was able to avert more defections by raising local grievances as a main motivator of al Qaeda affiliates in numerous theaters of activity, from the Sahel to the Arabian Peninsula.
Al Qaeda affiliates are now spread from northern Africa's Atlantic coast to South Asia. Nevertheless, their degree of loyalty to central leadership is unclear, it is crucial for al-Qaeda to have loyal affiliates to keep its rival, ISIS, under control. Al Zawahiri's death marks the end of a generation of Al Qaeda, a generation who formed the organization as a centralized organization and oversaw the transition to an independent franchise model.
The transfer of leadership not only jeopardizes al-Qaeda influence in global jihadist circles, but it also helps ISIS to consolidate its position. Since Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dismissed the authority of al-Qaeda and separated himself by declaring a caliphate, the two are waging a leadership battle for the global jihadist movement and it is expected to continue in the foreseeable future.
Locally in Afghanistan, IS-Khorasan, the most notorious branch of ISIS currently, is spreading propaganda that the Taliban are not real jihadists, emphasizing its alliances with Americans and non-believers. IS-K has been successful in attracting and recruiting disillusioned Taliban fighters and boosting their ranks.
Zawahiri's death has fueled speculation over who will be the new emir of al-Qaeda. Traditional wisdom has long implied that Saif al-Adel, an Egyptian jihadist veteran like Zawahiri, is believed to be the group's new leader. However, Adel is suspected of being in semi-house arrest in Iran, leaving him more vulnerable than some al-Qaida leaders would like to accept. Furthermore, Abu Muhammad al-Masri, a high-ranking al-Qaeda leader, was killed in Iran in a 2020 strike allegedly led by Israeli commandos. Adel would be exposed not only to the exploitation of the Iranian dictatorship, but also assassinated by counterterrorism units.
Following Zawahiri's death, Abd al-Rahman al-Maghrebi was also portrayed as a future al-Qaeda leader. Maghrebi is also Zawahiri's son-in-law and a senior leader, serving as al Qaeda's general manager since 2012 and head of its media arm, al-Sahab. He would be a suitable candidate for the role of Amir, he was described as a "rising star in al-Qaeda for many years" by the US State Department.
According to a recent UN report on al-Qaeda's succession, the report suggests Ahmed Diriye and Yazid Mebrak, al-Qaeda leaders in al-Shabab and the Islamic Maghreb, and, despite speculation that the former al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) commander Qasim al-Raymi, who was murdered in 2020, could be the next leader, no AQAP member, including current leader Khalid Batarfi, was identified as a potential successor to Zawahiri in the UN report.
Considering the importance of Syria as part of the global jihad, there is perhaps increasing pressure within al-Qaeda to identify someone like Abu Abd al-Karim al-Masri as the next leader of the organization. Masri is a senior leader of al-Qaeda's Syrian affiliate, Hurras al-Din, and is widely respected by younger generations of al-Qaeda jihadists.
Al-Qaeda may want to select an unknown youth militant as the next leader, probably to capture the interest of younger generations of potential jihadists. Who were not keen on Zawahiri's concern for the historical subtleties of Islamic theology, rather than the grievances that drive today's youth.
The Taliban takeover of Afghanistan last year provided al-Qaeda with a unique opportunity to bounce back. The United States and its allies are primarily focused on great-power competition with China and the war between Russia and Ukraine. The United States and its allies are heavily focused on the conflict between Ukraine and Russia and the great power rivalry with China. There is a sense of weariness over two decades of global counterterrorism campaigns and a desire to turn the tide. The death of Zawahiri could prove that the US can deal with the transnational terrorist threat by taking an offshore approach.
Perhaps the next leader of al-Qaeda will be better able to urge al-Qaeda supporters and inspire violent extremists in the west. Over the past two years, ISIS and al-Qaeda have seen a sequence of setbacks and losses of key figures. In order to restore their dominance over the global jihadist movement, both organizations continue to attempt to attack the West.
If the Taliban remain in power in Afghanistan and remain closely linked to al-Qaeda, as many experts believe, the possibility of a high-level western strike may re-emerge, moving the time from 2022 to pre-September 11 era in Afghanistan, which could once again become a failed state and a threat to global security.
The Taliban had long been pressured by U.S negotiators to break off their ties with al-Qaeda, and they were explicitly reluctant to do so. All they promised was that they would not allow al-Qaeda or other groups to use Afghan territory to launch attacks against the United States.
What remains doubtful is the United States' ability to monitor extremist activities in a country where they have no direct access or partner on the ground. The Taliban's apparent decision to host the world's most wanted terrorist will likely lead to further isolation of the Taliban, making surveillance more difficult, not to mention influence and what's going on there.
Killing the leadership of al-Qaeda and ISIS could slow down the group's momentum in the short term. However, it is unlikely that this will have a long-term impact on their operations and they will continue no matter who the new leader is. Such organisations value ideas rather than leadership.
Ideology is the greatest asset of al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the remnants of these groups choose to die for the cause.
by Hamzeh Abu Nowar
Back to Events
Killing the leadership of al-Qaeda and ISIS could slow down the group's momentum in the short term. However, it is unlikely that this will have a long-term impact on their operations and they will continue no matter who the new leader is. Such organisations value ideas rather than leadership.
Ideology is the greatest asset of al-Qaeda and ISIS, and the remnants of these groups choose to die for the cause.
Back to Events
MENA Research Senior Analyst